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Abstract 
 
This chapter provides a survey of law, economics, and finance scholarship at the intersection of 
corporate governance and financial distress.  In financial distress, both inside and outside of 
bankruptcy court, formal and informal control rights are paramount.  Thus, we organize our 
review around the major constituencies that exercise control rights in distressed firms: 
shareholders, managers and boards; senior and junior creditors; and the law, courts and judges.  
Broadly, our review suggests that an understanding of the incentives of these constituencies is 
crucial to explaining outcomes.  Our review also documents the paradigm shift in the bankruptcy 
literature, away from the “safe haven” view of Chapter 11as a slow, manager and shareholder-
controlled reorganization process.  Chapter 11 case outcomes are increasingly steered by 
sophisticated activist investors, generating faster resolutions that are more creditor-controlled.  
We suggest some directions for future research in light of these developments.        
 
 
Governance of a financially distressed firm is a complicated interplay of formal and informal 
control rights exercised by the firm’s many stakeholders--its shareholders, managers, employees, 
and creditors, among others--subject to oversight and limits imposed by the law and courts. The 
relative influence of these groups shifts over time as a firm heads toward default. This leads to 
some striking stylized facts about distressed firms in the U.S.: 
• Management and board turnover are extremely high, by some estimates reaching 90% for 
firms exiting Chapter 11. 
• Conflicts between the interests of equity holders and creditors (or even among creditors 
of differing priority) become exaggerated, potentially distorting investment incentives. 
• Banks and other creditors gain influence on firm decisions, as control rights are triggered 
by default. 
• Assets of the firm are redeployed by new owners who have purchased assets or have 
gained control of the firm via a restructuring. 
In this chapter, we describe the framework that determines when and how control rights are 
exercised, and the empirical evidence that gives us a description of how the governance of the 
distressed firm evolves. In the U.S., which is the primary focus of our analysis, Chapter 11 is the 
end game that influences the behavior of firms even prior to a default. As such, we first provide 
some brief background on the key provisions of Chapter 11 that are important to our 
understanding of the firm’s governance. We then examine in turn the role of each of the firm’s 
main constituencies who influence a potential restructuring. 
 
I. Overview of the Legal Environment 
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From a governance perspective, one of the crucial features of a Chapter 11 filing is that 
the debtor remains in possession; in other words, the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy managers can 
continue to manage the firm through the reorganization process. Allowing management to stay in 
control is thought to provide continuity and removes a disincentive to delay filing until the last 
minute.1 The bankruptcy court can remove management in favor of a trustee, but such 
appointments are rare in practice and tend to occur only in cases of fraud or extreme 
mismanagement.  Bankruptcy law does not, however, deprive the debtor’s board of directors of 
the power to replace management, and managerial turnover in and around bankruptcy is 
commonplace.  
The bankruptcy filing itself puts in place an “automatic stay” that limits creditor 
collection activities such as suing on debts and seizing collateral. Hence, the Bankruptcy Code 
provides substitute mechanisms to protect creditors that limit the debtor’s control rights over 
firm assets. For example, courts must approve the terms of the debtor’s post-bankruptcy credit 
facility (called debtor-in-possession, or DIP, financing). Courts must also approve sales of assets 
outside the ordinary course of business. Courts can limit the use of assets subject to a security 
interest as necessary to protect the creditor’s interest in the collateral.  
As is well-known, the traditional Chapter 11 reorganization requires a plan that 
determines the disposition of the firm’s assets, places investors into classes, and allocates the 
proceeds of the assets across classes. Management has an exclusive right to propose a 
reorganization plan during the first 120 days of bankruptcy, and this exclusivity period can be 
extended by the court up to a maximum of 18 months. To confirm a plan consensually, a 
proponent must obtain a sufficient share of votes (2/3 in value and ½ in number) in each class of 
impaired claims and interests. As the plan is a negotiated outcome, it can be approved by the 
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court even if it provides for distributions that violate the absolute priority of the claimants, i.e. 
junior claimants may receive some distribution even when more senior creditors have not been 
paid in full. Alternatively, the plan can be confirmed through a “cramdown”, which requires 
convincing a judge that the absolute priority rule is satisfied with respect to impaired classes that 
do not approve the plan.  
The Code provides that committees may be appointed to represent certain classes, 
increasing their voice and influence on the restructuring. The U.S. Trustee’s office, which 
oversees the administration of bankruptcy cases, typically appoints an unsecured creditors 
committee.  This committee has the power to investigate the debtor’s operations and finances, 
and to consult with the debtor on the plan of reorganization. Other committees must be approved 
by the court. For example, equity committees are much less frequently formed when it is clear to 
the court that equity has no remaining economic stake. Committee members, having access to 
non-public information regarding the development of the plan, are restricted from trading in the 
claims of the firm while serving in that role. 
Overall, the process of developing the plan, distributing its details to the voting parties in 
a disclosure statement, soliciting votes, and obtaining court approval for the plan can lead to 
substantial cost and delay. The process has changed to some degree in recent years, however, as 
it has become increasingly common for firms to achieve a de-facto reorganization by selling the 
firm’s assets as a going concern to a new entity with a healthier capital structure. This can be 
done outside a plan of reorganization under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. Because a 
creditor vote is not required in advance, the Section 363 sale provides a faster means of 
disposing of the firm’s assets. Section 363(f), moreover, allows for assets to be sold free and 
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clear of liens and other obligations, such as product liability claims, that might otherwise follow 
the assets to the buyer.  
Given the many parties that exercise control rights in distress, we will proceed by 
analyzing theory and evidence regarding the influence of each of the major constituencies in 
turn. In Section II, we summarize the relevant literature on shareholders, managers, and boards. 
Sections III and IV discuss senior and junior creditors, respectively. Section V discusses the role 
of law, courts, and judges, and concludes with some brief suggestions for future research.  
 
II. Shareholders, Managers and Boards 
 
II.a. The role of shareholders 
 As the firm becomes financially distressed, shareholders are increasingly “out of the 
money,” raising two important governance concerns. First, to the extent that equity still has 
control rights, do equity holders (or management acting on their behalf) take actions to preserve 
their option-like value, perhaps at the expense of the ultimately recoverable firm value? Second, 
when does (or should) equity lose its control rights, and what role do equity holders have in a 
restructuring when that does occur? 
 
Actions that benefit “out of the money” equity  
A number of theoretical papers warn that the limited liability feature of equity provides 
incentives for excessive risk taking when the firm is distressed, particularly prior to a bankruptcy 
filing (these include Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992), White (1996), and Hart (2000)). Paying 
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dividends to the equity holders of an already highly levered firm could also be viewed as 
symptomatic of this conflict (Hotchkiss, Smith and Stromberg, 2012). 
Empirical evidence of this behavior has been elusive, and it may be the case that there are 
other factors which mitigate these incentives. For example, Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) suggest 
that the potential for managers to be rehired when a firm exits bankruptcy could limit incentives 
for risk shifting. They examine a sample of 170 bankruptcies in Sweden (between 1988 and 
1991) where, unlike the U.S., the CEO loses control of the firm upon filing, a trustee is 
appointed, and the firm is auctioned. Income losses to CEOs of bankrupt firms are very large, 
indicating the personally costly nature of the filing. However, by investing conservatively, the 
CEO increases the probability that he/she will be rehired by the restructured firm. Other 
researchers have noted that restrictive loan or bond covenants could also limit risk shifting 
behavior. Gormley and Matsa (2011) suggest that the agency problem between risk-averse 
managers and risk-seeking equity holders may explain the relative scarcity of risk-seeking in 
distress. Consistent with this idea, they find evidence that managers whose firms are exposed to 
carcinogen liability are more likely to acquire cash-rich firms in unrelated industries to reduce 
bankruptcy risk.  
 The incentives of equity holders to increase risky investment should similarly provide 
incentives to delay default or filing, to the extent those events trigger a loss of equity’s control 
rights. Within the asset pricing literature, much of the existing theory of defaultable corporate 
debt focuses on equity holders’ optimal default policy. Using a contingent-claims framework, 
Black and Cox (1976) and Geske (1977) value coupon-paying debt and solve for the equity 
holders’ optimal default policy when asset sales are restricted. Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner 
(1989), Leland (1994), Leland and Toft (1996), Leland (1998), and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland 
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(2000) examine default policy in the problem of optimal capital structure. In practice, since the 
optimal filing point is unobservable, we cannot readily determine whether filings are in fact 
delayed to the benefit of equity holders. In their empirical study of failures subsequent to highly 
leveraged transactions (HLTs), Andrade and Kaplan (1998) examine qualitative description of 
actions taken by 31 distressed firms, and find that 14 firms took actions that delayed the 
resolution of distress, and that the delay appears to have been costly for at least 9 firms. Adler, 
Capkun and Weiss (2006) suggest that the firm will be in worse financial condition at the time of 
filing if it has delayed (see Section III.b. below).  
Once in bankruptcy, the change in legal environment may make it more difficult to 
increase risky investment on behalf of equity. As explained above, the incumbent management 
remains in control of the firm’s operations in bankruptcy, but management is not free to act in 
the interests of shareholders alone. Most important actions require court approval and provide the 
opportunity for interested parties to object. Nevertheless, it may still be possible for management 
to take actions benefiting shareholders. For example, constituencies may disagree as to the best 
operating strategy for the firm, or whether certain asset sales, and the timing of these sales, are in 
the best interest of the overall bankruptcy estate.2  
While direct evidence of risk shifting is sparse, continued investment in the existing 
assets of a failing company could be considered as risky investment, since immediate liquidation 
might provide a greater recovery value. An extreme illustration of the potential magnitude of 
creditor/shareholder conflicts in this setting is given by Weiss and Wruck (1998), who describe 
at length the 1989 bankruptcy of Eastern Airlines. Ex-post, it is clear that creditor recoveries 
would have been substantially greater had Eastern been liquidated at the time of its Chapter 11 
filing. However, under the supervision of the bankruptcy court, Eastern continued to fly and to 
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generate large operating losses, ultimately ending in its liquidation 22 months later. Weiss and 
Wruck estimate that Eastern’s value declined by over $2 billion while in bankruptcy, and that the 
company was insolvent well prior to the liquidation. 
More generally, larger sample evidence on this type of behavior is difficult to produce. In 
their same study of 31 distressed HLTs, Andrade and Kaplan (1998) find no evidence of risk 
shifting or asset substitution, which they define as large investments in unusually risky capital 
expenditures, projects, or acquisitions. Overall, it remains somewhat debatable whether 
management engages in riskier investment on behalf of equity holders, or whether they act more 
conservatively as the firm becomes distressed. 
 
Equity control rights 
 Outside Chapter 11, shareholder control is subject to two limitations. The first stems from 
the shifting fiduciary obligations of the board of directors, since those fiduciary responsibilities 
expand to include the creditors of the company once the firm is near insolvency (Branch, 2000). 
The second limitation stems from the rights of creditors if the firm either violates covenants in its 
debt agreements or defaults on a contractual payment. We discuss each of these in turn in 
Section II.c. and Section III below.  
Shareholders can retain some influence over outcomes in distress through several 
mechanisms. First, shareholders retain their formal rights to replace the board and management 
inside and outside bankruptcy. Second, shareholders can represent their interests in bankruptcy 
through official committees, and they retain the rights to vote on a reorganization plan. The 
equity class must approve any consensual plan of reorganization, and cramdown is generally 
regarded as a more costly, time-consuming alternative because the firm must be valued to 
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determine entitlements. The delay inherent in confirming a cramdown plan can give shareholders 
bargaining power.  
Evidence for shareholder bargaining power can be found in the prevalence of deviations 
from priority toward equity, especially in the early days of the Bankruptcy Code. For example,  
Eberhart, Moore and Roenfeldt (1990), Franks and Torous (1989), and Betker (1995) find that 
these deviations are common. Most recently, though, for a sample of 626 bankruptcy 
reorganizations between 1980 and 2005, Bharath, Panchapegesan and Werner (2010) document a 
substantial decline in the frequency of deviations from the absolute priority rule (APR). Indeed, 
in 2000-2005, absolute priority is violated in only 22% of their sample cases, in contrast to 75% 
of cases in the 1980s. They also find that deviations from priority in favor of equity are more 
likely when management has greater shareholdings, providing greater incentive to act in equity’s 
interest. Each of these empirical studies examines firms that were publicly registered companies 
prior to their bankruptcy; in private companies where management has a greater or even 100% 
stake, management has more incentive to act in behalf of equity interests. At the other extreme, 
even when management has no economic ties to equity, deviations from absolute priority may 
reflect the desire to reach a consensual plan outcome more quickly by paying equity holders their 
“nuisance” value.  
 
II.b. The role of managers 
 Since management has the ability to stay in control even as a debtor in possession in 
Chapter 11, it is important to understand how their incentives, and therefore actions, are likely to 
be affected by financial distress. Early discussion of the merits of the Chapter 11 system included 
criticism that the process was too protective of incumbent management, allowing them to retain 
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too much control and failing to punish managers for poor performance (Bradley and 
Rosenzweig, 1992).  
The idea that bankruptcy provides a safe haven for management has been refuted in 
subsequent empirical research. Managers frequently lose their jobs in financial distress. Altman 
& Hotchkiss (p. 222, Table 10.1) summarize research showing that management turnover is 
extremely high; top management turnover by the time firms exit Chapter 11 ranges from 70% to 
91%, depending on the sample studied. For out of court restructurings, turnover estimates range 
from 36% to 60%. Gilson (1989) is one of the earliest researchers to document management 
turnover conditional on financial distress. Studying 73 managers who depart from financially-
distressed firms between 1979 and 1984, he finds that none of the departing executives in his 
sample are employed by another exchange-listed firm in the subsequent three years. Gilson and 
Vetsuypens (1993) study 77 financially distressed public firms restructuring in 1981-1987. They 
show that managers who remain on average take cuts to their compensation, and that CEO 
replacements from within the firm earn 35% less than their predecessor. This evidence suggests 
strongly the costly nature of distress for firms’ managers.  
More recently, Eckbo, Thorburn and Wang (2012) quantify the personal cost to top 
managers of Chapter 11 firms. Their study covers CEOs of 342 U.S. public companies filing for 
Chapter 11 between 1996 and 2007. More than half of incumbent CEOs regain full-time 
employment, the majority of which become top executives at another firm. The change in 
compensation of those maintaining full-time executive employment is close to zero. The other 
half of CEOs who do not maintain full-time employment experience an income loss with a 
median present value of $4 million (discounted until retirement age). Overall, their estimates 
imply an ex ante expected median personal bankruptcy cost of $2.7 million (in constant 2009 
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dollars), or three times the typical annual compensation. To the extent that financial distress is a 
costly event, it will have a strong impact on managers’ behavior prior to distress, providing 
incentives to choose lower leverage or less risky investments.  
 Given the complicated interplay of formal and informal control rights in bankruptcy, it 
remains an open empirical question: whose interests does management actually represent when a 
firm is distressed? There are reasons to expect management to be aligned with different 
constituencies depending on the circumstances of the case. When management has a large equity 
ownership stake prior to default, it has an incentive to preserve that value by pursuing equity’s 
interests in a restructuring. On the other hand, management’s loyalties may shift to the group that 
will control the company subsequent to the reorganization. For example, Gilson, Hotchkiss, and 
Ruback (2000) argue that sometimes management will form a coalition with senior creditors 
when it is likely that this group will control the company subsequent to a restructuring. At the 
other end of the capital structure, new owners that contribute equity to an emerging firm may 
choose to keep the incumbent management in place (Gilson, Hotchkiss and Ruback, 2000), 
similar to the behavior documented by Eckbo and Thorburn (2003). 
 
II.c. The role of the board  
In non-distressed settings, much of the discussion of the role of the board in our post- 
Sarbanes Oxley environment involves whether boards are effective monitors, and how best to 
populate the board with insider vs. independent members. Much of that discussion becomes to 
some degree of secondary importance when the firm is distressed.  Key questions involving the 
board become: where do their fiduciary duties lie if the firm is insolvent (and how is insolvency 
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identified)? What happens when existing board members need to be replaced, and what interests 
do new board members typically represent? 
The fiduciary duties of managers and directors to shareholders expand to the corporation, 
specifically including creditors, when the firm is in the “zone of insolvency.”3 Though the firm is 
generally insolvent upon filing a bankruptcy petition, there is an obvious measurement problem 
in determining the point in time prior to filing where insolvency occurs. Further, from the Credit 
Lyonnais case, the duty to creditors applies when the company is near insolvency, perhaps 
applying to the firm with serious operating problems.  
Becker and Stromberg (2012) examine the impact of the Delaware court’s ruling in the 
1991 Credit Lyonnais v Pathe Communications case, which argued the fiduciary duties extend to 
creditors not when the firm is insolvent, but rather when it is in the “zone” of insolvency. They 
compare Delaware corporations to firms incorporated elsewhere before and after this ruling; in 
this way, they can show that the ruling increased the likelihood of equity issues, increased 
investment, and reduced firm risk for firms that were relatively closer to default. Thus, the ruling 
limited manager’s incentives to take actions favoring equity over debt for firms near financial 
distress.  
Determining at a given time whether a firm is at the point (or zone) of insolvency 
requires a valuation of the firm as a going concern, and therefore depends on the expected future 
performance of the company. Different constituencies may have different outlooks on the 
subsequent prospects of the firm, i.e. whether a decline is permanent or temporary (see figure 1, 
p. 423, Wruck (1989)). For example, Hotchkiss (1995) studies the cash flow forecasts issued by 
management (in disclosure statements) for firms in Chapter 11, and shows that firms’ incumbent 
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management is on average overly optimistic in projecting future cash flows for a reorganized 
company. 
The difficulties in determining in whose interest the board should be acting are 
exacerbated when the constituencies have conflicting interests. More senior claimants will tend 
to favor a liquidation of assets, particularly if it would lead to a full recovery of their claims at 
that point in time. Shareholders and possibly junior creditors, who potentially gain from a 
rebound in the value of the firm’s assets, are more biased toward continuation of the firm’s 
operations. Thus, if representing only shareholders, management and the board would be likely 
to support the actions described above which benefit shareholders such as delayed filing, asset 
substitution, increased risk taking, or simply failure to liquidate poorly performing assets. When 
fiduciary duties expand to creditors, however, the board theoretically may support actions which 
help creditors but impair equity value. This conflict can be particularly problematic when 
management is also a large shareholder of the firm.  
A significant number of incumbent board members resign when firms become distressed. 
Gilson (1990) is the first to study the composition of the board for distressed firms. Among 111 
publicly traded firms that file for bankruptcy or restructure out of court between 1979 and 1985, 
only 46% of pre-distress directors remain post-restructuring. Attracting new board members can 
be difficult given the time and expertise required to work with the firm during the restructuring 
process. Liability concerns may be heightened. To the extent new board members represent 
different constituencies such as employees, lenders, or other investors, new members may 
represent conflicting interests. Investors may avoid membership on the board (or on bankruptcy 
committees) as it restricts their ability to continue trading claims in the firm. While it may make 
sense to have representatives of banks and other creditors on board once the fiduciary duties 
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have shifted, populating the board while the firm is in the midst of a restructuring represents a 
challenge. 
One source of new board members is investors who aim to have a longer term stake in 
the restructured company, often gaining control of the restructured firm. This type of active 
“vulture” investor is studied by Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997). While some distressed 
investors aim to passively gain from increases in value of the claims they hold, many become 
active in governance on the firm’s board (while some ultimately gain control of the firm and/or 
assume management positions). They find that vultures join boards of 27% of the firms in their 
sample of 288 firms defaulting on public debt between 1980 and 1993, and retain these positions 
for at least one year post-restructuring for more than half of their sample. 
 
III. Senior secured creditors 
While equity holder value maximization is consistent with maximizing the total value of 
the non-distressed firm, senior creditors may prefer a less risky strategy that preserves the value 
of their claims. Thus, if senior lenders are in control, they may induce the firm to implement a 
suboptimal investment and financial policy. On the other hand, if the firm is deeply insolvent, 
senior creditors may in fact be the residual claimants, and as such promote firm value 
maximization. Chapter 11 determines the relative bargaining power of the different claimholders. 
Since voluntary out-of-court workouts are negotiated under the threat of bankruptcy filing, the 
outcome is substantially influenced by the allocation of control rights in Chapter 11. In this 
section, we survey studies of senior lender control over the firm in financial distress and 
bankruptcy. 
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III.a. Senior lender control in financial distress 
As discussed above, managerial turnover rates increase when the firm performs poorly. 
Interestingly, a large fraction of these management changes are initiated by senior lenders. In 
Gilson’s (1989) study of 381 public firms that experience large stock price declines in 1979-
1984, one-fifth of the management departures are initiated by bank lenders. While creditors do 
not own equity, they are able to force management changes by threatening shareholders with 
bankruptcy or to petition to the court to have a trustee appointed. 
Bank lenders also try to align managerial incentives by tying the compensation of the 
firm’s top executives to creditor wealth. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) report that over ten 
percent of their sample firms enact plans that explicitly tie CEO compensation or wealth to the 
value of creditors’ claims. This may or may not maximize the value of the firm. If banks are the 
residual claimants, such a compensation policy is consistent with firm value maximization. 
However, if a junior claim is the “fulcrum” security, it risks implementing a strategy that 
preserves the value of senior claims at the expense of junior creditors.4 
Banks further influence the selection of directors in distressed firms. Gilson (1990) shows 
that banks affect the outcome of board elections and sometimes influence board membership 
directly, for example, by letting bank executives join the board while the firm is restructuring its 
debt. Such a strategy is not without problems, however. In particular, banks must balance a direct 
control over the firm with an increased risk of becoming a target of lender liability law-suits. 
Several studies emphasize the role of covenants as an important governance mechanism 
for bank lenders. In particular, these covenants become stricter after a distressed restructuring. 
Gilson (1990) reports that a large fraction of amended bank loan covenants grant banks veto 
power over the firm’s dividend and payout policies, capital expenditures, divestitures, mergers, 
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new financing, and senior management hiring and firing decisions. A similarly large percentage 
of restructurings enact more general restrictions on firms’ investment and financing policies, 
often capping activities such as capital expenditures, asset dispositions, divestitures, payouts and 
total borrowing. Following a default, creditors seem to acquire direct control over many 
corporate investment and payout policies. 
When a financial covenant is violated (a technical default), creditors obtain the same 
contractual rights as in a payment default. This includes a right to immediate repayment of the 
principal and a termination of the loan commitment. Secured lenders typically use these rights to 
influence the firm’s investment and financial policies while renegotiating the credit agreement. 
Nini, Smith and Sufi (2011) examine 3,500 financial covenant violations by US 
nonfinancial public firms from 1997 to 2008. They document a decline in capital expenditures 
and acquisitions following a covenant violation. Moreover, violating firms decrease their 
leverage as well as payouts to shareholders. The amended credit agreements exhibit tighter 
terms, including reduced funding, shorter maturity, a higher frequency of collateral requirement 
and more restrictive financial covenants. There is also an increased likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover in the quarter that a firm violates its covenants. Importantly, the firm’s operating 
performance and stock returns both improve following a technical default, suggesting that the 
increased creditor governance create value for shareholders.  
Banks also play a role in the firm’s decision to restructure out-of-court versus under 
Chapter 11. Gilson, John and Lang (1990) examine this choice for 169 public companies that 
became severely financially distressed in 1978-1987. They find that a distressed firm is more 
likely to recontract out-of-court when it has a larger fraction of bank debt in its capital structure, 
there are fewer lenders, and it has a relatively large fraction of intangible assets. 
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As the financially distressed firm is restructured, senior creditors frequently end up as 
major stockholders. While banks and other financial institutions typically are prohibited to own 
stock in nonfinancial firms, there are exceptions for equity obtained in a debt restructuring or 
bankruptcy reorganization plan.5 Gilson (1990) documents that banks and insurance companies 
receive significant ownership—on average 37 percent of the common stock—in almost half of 
the restructured firms. Similarly, James (1995) finds that banks take equity in 31 percent of the 
restructured firms and receive on average 43 percent of the common stock. He studies a sample 
of 102 voluntary debt restructurings in 1981-1990. The equity is awarded primarily in return for 
forgiveness of principal on the bank’s loans (on average 41 percent of the loan amount). Banks 
continue to hold substantial amounts of common stock two years after the debt restructuring.  
James (1995) further explores the role of banks in debt restructurings. He shows that, if 
the firm has public debt, banks rarely make concessions unless public debtholders also exchange 
their claims for equity (Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) make a similar point). In half of 
the restructurings where banks take equity, the firm has public debt outstanding. However, banks 
will not take equity without a restructuring of the public debt. The likelihood that the bank takes 
equity decreases with the proportion of public debt and increases with the firm’s growth 
opportunities (market-to-book ratio). Firms in which banks take equity are more cash-flow 
constrained and have poorer operating performance prior to the restructuring. However, these 
firms have better cash-flow performance after the restructuring than firms with no bank 
ownership. 
Not only is a restructuring of the public debt critical to the participation of banks, but 
bank concessions are also important for the success of the public debt exchange. Using a sample 
of 68 distressed debt exchange offers in the 1980s, James (1996) shows that exchange offers 
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accompanied by bank concessions are associated with a greater reduction of the public debt 
outstanding and are more likely to succeed than restructurings where banks do not participate. 
He suggests that banks help reduce information asymmetries and thus holdout problems among 
the public debt holders. 
Gilson (1997) examines leverage changes for 108 firms that file for Chapter 11 or 
restructure their debt out of court in 1979-1989. He documents that leverage ratios remain 
relatively high after financially distressed firms recontract with their creditors and particularly 
high for firms that restructure in a workout. He suggests that transaction costs limit the extent to 
which creditors are willing to reduce their debt when distressed firms restructure out of court. 
Such transactions costs include various regulations that discourage lenders from writing down 
their principal and exchanging debt for equity, tax disadvantages, and holdout problems.6 
Consistently, he finds that debt reductions in out-of-court restructurings are lower the higher the 
number of long-term debt contracts and the higher fraction of institutional debt. Asset sales are 
associated with debt reductions in workouts and even greater debt reductions in formal 
bankruptcy reorganizations, perhaps because Chapter 11 reduces the cost of selling assets as 
discussed further below. The new capital structure of firms restructuring their debt in Chapter 11 
involves fewer long-term debt contracts, a higher debt ownership concentration, and greater 
flexibility in debt repayment. 
Overall, the evidence indicates that senior creditors play an active role in corporate 
governance and the restructuring of distressed firms outside of bankruptcy 
 
III.b. Senior lender control rights in bankruptcy 
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Once a firm files for Chapter 11, pre-bankruptcy secured lenders can no longer enforce 
the rights triggered by loan covenant violations, due to bankruptcy’s automatic stay. 
Nevertheless, banks and other secured lenders have become more adept in controlling a firm’s 
activity before and during the bankruptcy. Pre-bankruptcy lines of credit can limit the borrower’s 
access to cash to fund operations, putting the lender in control of the timing of a filing. Lenders 
can take a security interest in a debtor’s entire asset base, leaving less free assets available for 
other potential lenders and hence, limiting a borrower’s liquidity. Once in bankruptcy, debtor-in-
possession loans also increasingly dictate the outcomes of bankruptcy cases in direct and indirect 
ways. These important trends were first brought to light in the law literature (Skeel 2003, 2004; 
Baird and Rasmussen 2002, 2006; Warren and Westbrook 2003). The evidence in this early 
literature is largely anecdotal, documenting these trends through a small number of high-profile 
examples. 
Ayotte and Morrison (2009) provide more comprehensive evidence of this creditor 
control trend. In particular, they document the pre- and post-petition financing activities of 153 
large private and public US firms filing for Chapter 11 in 2001. In the sample of pre-petition 
credit facilities, 97 percent were secured by a lien on all, or nearly all, of the firm’s assets. 
Interestingly, most of these credit facilities are originated in the year prior to bankruptcy filing. 
Through the security interest in the firm’s assets, senior lenders effectively get control over the 
company’s access to cash and thus the timing of its bankruptcy filing. Moreover, the firm cannot 
raise additional funds in bankruptcy without the permission of, or offering adequate protection 
to, the pre-petition secured lenders. As a result, these loans help senior lenders to obtain control 
rights inside and outside bankruptcy. 
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An important way for senior creditors to gain control over the bankrupt firm’s day-to-day 
decisions is to provide additional financing in bankruptcy through a debtor-in-possession (DIP) 
loan. Dahiya, John, Puri and Ramirez (2003) examine 538 firms that file for Chapter 11 in the 
period 1988-1997. One third of the firms in their sample obtain a DIP loan, a majority (58%) of 
which are provided by a pre-petition lender. There is an increasing trend in the use of DIP 
financing, with a higher fraction of firms obtaining DIP loans in the second half of the sample 
period. Larger firms, retail firms, and firms with more current assets are more likely to get DIP 
financing in bankruptcy.7 
Ayotte and Morrison (2009) show that senior creditors exercise substantial control over 
the bankrupt firms through these DIP loan covenants. Three-quarters of the firms in their sample 
obtain post-petition financing either through a DIP facility (50 percent) or through a cash 
collateral order (26 percent), allowing the debtor to use cash in which a pre-existing creditor has 
a security interest. Cash collateral motions frequently contain the same terms as those found in 
DIP loans.  
Importantly, the vast majority of the post-petition financing contain detailed covenants 
restricting the firm’s use of cash while operating in bankruptcy. Three-quarters of the loans 
impose specific line-item budgets on the firm, requiring the firm to submit detailed evidence of 
cash receipts and expenditures. A deviation from the budget of a specified margin (usually 5-15 
percent) is considered a default. Other stringent covenants include limits on capital expenditures, 
operating profitability targets, and deadlines for submitting a plan of reorganization or selling 
assets. Ninety-two percent of the DIP loans in Ayotte and Morrison (2009) are secured by all of 
the firm’s assets. This is imperative because if the bankrupt company violates any of the loan 
covenants, the DIP lender can cut off credit and force liquidation. Overall, senior secured lenders 
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appear to exert significant control over the bankruptcy process through provisions attached to 
post-petition loans. 
The control rights associated with new post-petition financing of bankrupt firms is also 
examined by McGlaun (2007). His sample is 90 US firms filing for Chapter 11 filings in 1997-
2004. Similar to Ayotte and Morrison (2009), he documents that covenants give the lender 
control over the debtor’s cash, and impose approval of line item budgets, restrictions on the 
reorganization plans, and requirements to employ restructuring specialists. Consistent with the 
latter, Eckbo, Thorburn and Wang (2012) find a higher forced CEO turnover rate when the 
firm’s pre-petition lenders provide DIP financing to the bankrupt firm. McGlaun (2007) further 
shows that firms with a senior secured pre-petition lender are more likely to negotiate new 
financing in bankruptcy, providing the lender with continued control rights. It is possible that 
rights are more valuable to a senior secured lender that also serves as DIP lender, since the lender 
now is able to exercise control rights protecting the new DIP loan as well as the existing 
prepetition loan.  
Bharath, Panchapegesan and Werner (2010) suggest that Chapter 11 has become more 
creditor friendly in recent years, in that deviations from absolute priority in favor of equity have 
declined. This is consistent with the conjecture by Skeel (2003), who argues that increasing 
creditor control through DIP financing combined with bonuses to key executives that are 
explicitly tied to the reorganization process deter deviations from APR.  
The increased creditor control over the firm in Chapter 11 reorganization may affect 
managers’ incentives to promptly file for bankruptcy. Adler, Capkun and Weiss (2006) propose 
that debtors filing for Chapter 11 after 2001, when a change in the Uniform Commercial Code 
allowed creditors to take a security interest in the firm’s bank accounts and thus gain greater 
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control over the firm’s liquidity, are in significantly worse financial condition than firms filing 
prior to 2000. Their sample is 443 large US firms filing for Chapter 11 between 1993 and 2004. 
They suggest that this is consistent with managers intentionally delaying bankruptcy filing in an 
attempt to entirely avoid the bankruptcy process, possibly with the support of secured creditors 
who primarily care about their own claim.  
It appears that bank lenders also could play an important role when firms are auctioned. 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2009) examine mandatory auctions of distressed firms under the Swedish 
bankruptcy code. They find that the bank of the distressed firm often provides financing to a 
bidder in the auction. This increases liquidity and competition in the auction. However, 
consistent with a strategy to maximize expected recovery, the bank-financed bidder tends to bid 
more aggressively when the bank’s claim is impaired, possibly resulting in an ex-post inefficient 
allocation of the firm. Their evidence on firm post-bankruptcy operating performance, however, 
fails to support such allocation inefficiencies. 
Woo (2011) argues that banks recently are driven by financial regulations and regulatory 
policy to push their bankrupt borrowers to sell assets rather than reorganize under Chapter 11. 
Specifically, rules related to concentration risk and capital adequacy make it costly for banks to 
take new debt and equity claims in the restructured firm. For a sample of 285 US construction 
and development loans in 11/2007-12/2008, Woo finds that banks with a higher loan 
concentration as more likely to obtain relief from the automatic stay to pursue foreclosure. To the 
extent the assets are sold at fire-sales prices, this could lead to a suboptimal allocation of 
corporate assets. 
 
IV. Junior creditors 
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Junior and senior creditors may have conflicting interests in bankruptcy. Since the 
distribution of claims under the reorganization plan is closely tied to the value of the firm, this 
conflict primarily involves the valuation of the firm. Junior unsecured claims are generally 
widely held and therefore often suffer from a coordination problem. However, these claims as 
well as senior debt claims are commonly acquired and consolidated by hedge funds and other 
distressed investors, who become major players in the restructuring of the distressed firm.  
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) were the first to systematically show that such vulture 
investors play an important role in the governance of distressed firm, finding evidence of vulture 
investor activity for 60 percent of the firms they study. These investors typically acquire more 
than one-third of the face value of the debt claims in which they invest, a position which gives 
them a blocking position in that class for voting on a bankruptcy plan. The vulture investors join 
the board of directors for 28 percent of the sample firms and become CEO or chairman for 9 
percent of the firms. Moreover, the distressed investors gain a controlling position, defined as 
obtaining a majority of the voting stock in the restructured firm or holding the CEO or chairman 
position, in 16 percent of the firms, often through the purchase of bank loans. Importantly, 
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) show that the improvement in the post-restructuring operating 
performance is greater when vulture investors gain control of the restructured firm or sit on the 
board, suggesting that these investors bring valuable governance to the target. 
Much has happened with the trading of distressed claims since the 1980s. Jiang, Li and 
Wang (2012) examine vulture activity for a sample of 474 Chapter 11 cases from 1996 to 2007. 
Hedge fund presence has become a defining characteristic of the process, with hedge funds 
taking positions in 90 percent of the bankrupt sample firms. Hedge funds primarily invest in 
unsecured debt because it often is the fulcrum security, i.e. the debt class that gets converted into 
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equity in the restructured firm. When hedge funds purchase junior debt claims, there is a higher 
likelihood of competing reorganization plans, CEO turnover and adoption of key employee 
retention plans (KERP). Moreover, hedge fund presence increases the probability that the 
distressed firm successfully restructures, which is typically associated with higher total recovery 
rates and higher payoffs to junior creditors, often in the form of equity. The evidence is 
consistent with hedge funds bringing efficiency gains when they invest in distressed debt.  
 The role of hedge funds is also studied by Lim (2010) for a relatively recent sample of 
184 financially distressed firms from the period 1998-2009. He finds that hedge funds invest in 
two-thirds of the sample firms and on average ends up owning 35 percent of the equity in the 
reorganized firm. Interestingly, hedge funds tend to target the fulcrum security of economically 
healthier firms in order to participate in the reorganization of the distressed firm. Hedge funds’ 
presence as creditors increases the likelihood of prepackaged bankruptcy filing (where the 
reorganization plan is negotiated prior to filing) and debt-for-equity swaps. When hedge funds 
contribute new equity, the duration of the restructuring is reduced.  
Ivashina, Iverson, and Smith (2011) confirm the importance of active investors by 
examining detailed data on the capital structure for 136 firms filing for US Chapter 11 between 
1998 and 2009. Using a unique dataset obtained from claims agents in Chapter 11 cases, they 
observe the evolution of ownership of these claims during the Chapter 11 case.  They find that 
the trading of claims in bankruptcy leads to higher concentration of ownership, and in particular 
for debt claims that are eligible to vote on the reorganization plan. Active investors, such as 
hedge funds, are the largest net buyers and increase their ownership from 10 percent (at filing) to 
15 percent of the bankrupt firm’s claims at the time the votes are tabulated. This consolidation of 
claims is associated with a faster restructuring and a higher probability of a going-concern sale, 
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but lower total recovery rates. Overall, vulture investors appear to fill an important governance 
role in the restructuring of distressed firms. 
The valuation of the bankrupt firm plays an integral role for the distribution of value 
under the reorganization plan. Underestimating the firm’s value increases the proportion of the 
value that goes to senior creditors, while overestimating the value allows junior creditors to get a 
free option on the reorganized firm. Gilson, Hotchkiss and Ruback (2000) study the relation 
between the market value of 63 firms emerging from Chapter 11 in 1979-1993 and the value 
implied by cash flow forecasts in their reorganization plans. They find that estimated firm values 
are systematically lower when a senior creditor gains control of the equity of the restructured 
firm and higher when creditors use junior debt to gain control. Estimated values are also lower 
when management receives stock or options in the restructured firm and when the distressed firm 
sells new equity to a third party under the reorganization plan, suggesting that valuations are 
used strategically in bankruptcy to promote desired outcomes. 
Lemmon, Ma and Tashjian (2009) examine the impact of labor unions on the 
restructuring of the distressed firm. For a sample of 505 firms filing for Chapter 11 in 1991-
2004, they show that Chapter 11 is effective in reorganizing the capital structure of financially 
distressed firms, allowing them to emerge, while redeploying the assets of economically 
distressed firms into other uses. Among the firms that successfully reorganize, firms that are 
unionized reduce their work force by 9 percent less than nonunionized firms, controlling for 
other factors. With an average employment reduction of 25 percent in their sample, this 
difference is meaningful, suggesting that labor unions maintain substantial bargaining power in 
Chapter 11 and influence the restructuring outcome. 
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V. Law, Courts, and Judges 
Though the various economic stakeholders analyzed above (shareholders, managers, and 
creditors) largely control the firm in distress, these control rights are limited in important ways 
by formal law and courts. The empirical evidence documented above suggests that the 
bankruptcy process has become faster and more creditor-controlled. Instead of the traditional 
reorganization—a restructuring of the claims of the going-concern within its existing corporate 
shell--a majority of Chapter 11 cases are going-concern sales or piece-meal liquidation sales 
(Ayotte and Morrison 2009). Some have suggested that in this new environment, bankruptcy 
judges have become no more than de-facto auctioneers (Buccola and Keller 2010), while others 
have proclaimed these developments as the end of bankruptcy (Baird and Rasmussen 2002).  
Notwithstanding these important developments that would seem to de-emphasize the role 
of the law and courts, empirical research to date has found important differences in bankruptcy 
outcomes created by variation across jurisdictions, individual judges, and Bankruptcy Code 
chapters. Some research has also investigated the impact of important court decisions and 
statutory changes on firm and investor behavior.  
The financial crisis brought about a new set of questions from a policy perspective 
involving the interaction of governance and financial distress. The Chapter 11 filing of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 raised important questions about the suitability of bankruptcy law 
for resolving distress in a systemically important financial firm. The Chrysler and General 
Motors cases have raised issues of government control and priority in “managed” bankruptcies, 
and exposed controversies regarding the “363 sale” as a substitute for traditional reorganization. 
 
V.a. Venue and Chapter Choice 
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A debtor filing for bankruptcy in the U.S. typically has a choice of several venues in 
which to file its bankruptcy petition, which include the district of the debtor’s principal place of 
business, and the district that includes the company’s state of incorporation.8 This menu of 
options has led to patterns whereby one venue becomes the preferred “forum of choice” for 
debtors that seek to file outside their home district. In the 1980’s, the Southern District of New 
York (SDNY) was the preferred forum of choice, but Delaware became the dominant forum in 
the 1990s. In the last decade, Delaware and SDNY have shared prominence. Scholars have tried 
to determine the reasons why companies choose certain venues and the consequences of these 
choices; i.e. whether venue choice produces a “race to the top” or a “race to the bottom”.  
The “race to the bottom” view is most associated with a series of papers by Lynn 
LoPucki and co-authors (Eisenberg and LoPucki 1999, LoPucki and Kalin 2001, LoPucki and 
Doherty 2002, LoPucki 2005). Under this view, courts compete for cases that offer more 
favorable outcomes to the constituencies that drive the venue decision—debtors, their managers, 
and their attorneys in particular—at the expense of overall value. The main evidence supporting 
this view is that Delaware and SDNY reorganizations were observed as more likely than 
reorganizations in other courts to re-file for Chapter 11 a second time (informally known as a 
“Chapter 22”), and exhibit weaker financial performance following emergence. LoPucki (2005) 
argues that this evidence is consistent with an inefficient, laissez-faire approach to scrutinizing 
reorganization plans. In effect, this perspective leads to a normative argument for greater court 
control over plans of reorganization. 
Much of the literature on venue choice disputes these conclusions on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. Theoretically, the main criticism of these studies is the reliance on refiling 
rates as a measure of bankruptcy court effectiveness (Rasmussen and Thomas 2001). For 
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example, Kahl (2002) suggests that firms emerging from bankruptcy might be optimally kept on 
a “short leash” through higher leverage, so as to limit agency costs of inefficient continuation. 
This implies that higher refiling rates in a particular court can be consistent with a more efficient 
bankruptcy process.  
Empirically, scholars have noted the potential selection biases that might lead firms with 
higher unobserved refiling propensities to file in Delaware or New York, leading to a mistaken 
inference that venue choice causes failure (Skeel 2001). In addition, subsequent studies have 
found a countervailing advantage of speed in Delaware cases, and evidence that a Delaware 
filing is more likely when the company’s home court has handled less Chapter 11 cases, 
suggesting a preference for experience (Ayotte and Skeel 2004, 2006).    
The vibrant debate on the costs and benefits of venue choice in the bankruptcy literature 
has cooled in the last decade, but the underlying issues remain important. Proposals to restrict 
venue choice in bankruptcy have reappeared in Congress recently. The creditor control trend, 
moreover, intensifies the importance of judicial decision-making early in the bankruptcy case. 
Anecdotally, courts differ in their practices with respect to approval of DIP loan terms, and 
motions to pay “critical vendors”.9 These decisions can be cast as a real option to keep the firm 
running (Baird 2010): a denial of the motion may result in immediate liquidation, while approval 
keeps the liquidation/continuation option alive for another day. The extent to which these 
differences have affected venue choice and bankruptcy outcomes in the post-2000 period, to our 
knowledge, has not yet been addressed in empirical bankruptcy scholarship.  
In addition to choosing venue, debtors (and sometimes, creditors) choose the chapter 
under which the case is filed. There has been very little empirical literature examining 
differences across bankruptcy chapters, perhaps because of the very different circumstances 
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under which Chapter 7, Chapter 11, and Chapter 13 filings might occur. Bris, Welch and Zhu 
(2006) take on these challenges and present evidence against the notion that Chapter 11 is a 
slower, more costly means of reallocating assets than Chapter 7. Controlling for non-random 
selection into a chapter, they find that asset value is preserved less in Chapter 7, and time spent 
in bankruptcy is not significantly shorter in Chapter 7 once self-selection into a chapter is taken 
into account.  
 
V.b. Judges 
Framing the bankruptcy judge’s decision problem as a real option/optimal stopping 
problem has proven fruitful in the small business bankruptcy context as well. Morrison (2007) 
analyzes a sample of 95 Chapter 11 filings in the Northern District of Illinois in 1998. The study 
finds, contrary to received wisdom, that judges generally make quick shutdown decisions of non-
viable firms by dismissing cases or converting them to Chapter 7. Over 70 percent of shutdowns 
occurred within six months of the bankruptcy petition. The time to shutdown, moreover, is 
positively correlated with proxies for uncertainty about going-concern value, consistent with 
judicial maximization of the real option. 
As noted above in the venue choice literature, establishing causal effects of courts and 
judges has proven difficult. Chang and Schoar (2007) provide a notable exception, by exploiting 
random assignment of cases to judges within a judicial district. The random assignment allows 
for identification of differential tendencies across judges to approve “pro-debtor” and “pro-
creditor” motions.10 Chang and Schoar find significant effects of judicial bias on bankruptcy 
outcomes and post-bankruptcy performance. Surprisingly, they find that pro-debtor judges 
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increase the probability of shutdown and weaken post-bankruptcy performance of reorganized 
firms.  
 
V.c. The Rise of Section 363 and the Fire Sale Problem 
As noted above, while the substance of the Bankruptcy Code itself has changed little 
since its inception in 1978, corporate reorganization practice has changed dramatically. The rise 
of the 363 sale as an alternative to a traditional reorganization, and the willingness of bankruptcy 
courts to approve them, has been the subject of criticism. LoPucki and Doherty (2007) analyze a 
sample of 363 sales and traditional reorganizations of the largest public companies in 
bankruptcy, and find that recovery rates in reorganization cases are substantially higher. They 
suggest that this is indication of a fire sale bias in 363 sales, and conclude that permissive 
treatment of 363 sales is driven by the desire of courts to attract bankruptcy cases.  LoPucki and 
Doherty (2007) do not address the endogeneity of the sale/reorganization decision, however, 
except through pre-bankruptcy controls for performance, such as EBITDA/Assets. 
The general notion that assets sold by financially distressed firms are sold at a discount 
relative to similar sales by healthy sellers is supported by the evidence in Pulvino (1998, 1999) 
on distressed and non-distressed sales of aircraft. In a different auction setting, Eckbo and 
Thorburn (2008) document a greater discount in piecemeal sales of assets in Swedish mandatory 
bankruptcy auctions when the firm’s industry peers are financially distressed. However, they find 
no evidence of a fire-sale discount when the bankrupt firms are sold as going concerns. 
The literature highlights several reasons why fire sale problems may arise. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992) suggests that industry insiders are liquidity constrained and therefore cannot 
participate in an auction, while industry outsiders are unable to operate the assets at their first-
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best use. LoPucki and Doherty (2007) find examples of buyers in 363 sales hiring pre-
bankruptcy managers, and suggest this reflects a conflict of interest.11 Ayotte and Skeel (2006) 
raise the concern that DIP lenders are sometimes asset purchasers in 363 sales.12 Ayotte and 
Morrison (2009) find evidence that quick sales can be driven by secured creditor control, even 
when lenders are disconnected from buyers. They show that sales are most likely relative to 
reorganizations when secured creditors are over-secured. Over-secured creditors should have the 
strongest preference for an immediate sale over a longer reorganization: delay poses a downside 
risk if firm value declines, and little to no upside since the creditor’s recovery is capped at the 
value of its claim. Finally, as noted above, Woo (2011) provides theory and evidence that 
regulatory capital requirements based on portfolio concentration risk give secured lenders 
incentive to prefer liquidation over reorganization, even when the value of the secured creditor’s 
claim is higher under reorganization.  
 
The Auto Bankruptcies  
The controversy over 363 sales reached new heights in the wake of the Chrysler and GM 
bankruptcies in 2009. Both companies used the 363 sale mechanism to reorganize their capital 
structures. The Chrysler 363 sale generated the most discussion in the academic literature due to 
the distribution of value: secured creditors received $2 billion in cash in exchange for their 
secured claims, for a recovery of only 29 cents on the dollar. Chrysler (unsecured) employee 
benefit claimants received debt and stock in the new Chrysler. In this sense, the outcome can be 
seen as a deviation from priority: some unsecured claims received value, while secured claims 
were not paid in full. 
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The legal literature following the case debated whether the Chrysler outcome was a 
severe departure from existing, and ideal, bankruptcy law practice. Under one view (Roe and 
Skeel 2010), the Chrysler 363 sale dictated both the terms of the sale and the allocation of 
proceeds (sometimes called a sub rosa plan of reorganization). In these settings courts should, 
and often do, impose conditions on 363 sales that mimic creditor protections in a traditional 
reorganization. Morrison (2010), by contrast, argues that Chrysler is typical of modern 
bankruptcy practice in 363 sales, in which the DIP lender (in Chrysler, the government) controls 
the timing and terms of the sale. The decision to use taxpayer money to buy Chrysler and 
allocate a share to retirees can be seen as a question of bailout policy—one that is separate from 
the bankruptcy law question about whether the auction of Chrysler’s assets yielded full value. In 
this regard, though, the most consistent criticism of the Chrysler bankruptcy in the literature is 
that the bankruptcy auction was not set up to yield the highest price for the assets. The bidding 
procedures approved by the court effectively prevented bids that would liquidate Chrysler (Adler 
2010, Baird 2011). 
Though the Chrysler case generated important questions about the proper use of 363 
sales, the long-run impact of the case is probably limited. The Supreme Court vacated the 
Second Circuit’s opinion authorizing the sale, which limits its impact on legal precedent. 
Empirical evidence on the short-run economic impact is mixed. Anginer and Warburton (2010) 
find that bond markets did not respond significantly to any news about the Chrysler bankruptcy, 
but bonds of unionized firms outperformed bonds of non-unionized firms in response to news 
about the bailout loans that preceded the bankruptcy. Blaylock, Edwards and Stanfield (2011), on 
the other hand, find that more unionized firms perform relatively worse on several Chrysler-
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related event days up to and including the date of the bankruptcy filing. But they do not find any 
relative differences in bond price reactions to any legal events after the filing. 
 
Suggestions for future research 
These recent bankruptcy developments provide many open avenues for future research. 
The most interesting questions, moreover, can benefit from theory and empirical evidence 
combined with detailed institutional and legal knowledge. For example, the increasing use of 
Chapter 11 as an auction mechanism presents interesting theoretical questions. When should 
courts approve of auctions in lieu of traditional reorganizations, given the prevalence of creditor 
control and the potential fire sale problem?13 What incentive effects are created by protections 
afforded to pre-arranged bidders in the auction, so called “stalking horse” bidders? Empirically, 
how much variation is observed in auction procedures across cases, and what effects do these 
variations have on outcomes? Critical vendor payments, credit bidding, and claims trading are all 
important issues in bankruptcy that give rise to similar questions. Research on these questions 
can benefit from the expertise of both economists and legal scholars. 
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1 In a Chapter 7 liquidation, by contrast, management is automatically displaced in favor of a court-appointed 
trustee. 
2 During its 1984 bankruptcy, StorageTek invested in a new technology for tape storage devices. The successful 
investment increased firm value enough to bring equity “in the money,’ and the pre-bankruptcy holders retained 
their stake when the firm emerged from bankruptcy as the dominant player in their market. 
3 See Credit Lyonnais v. Pathe Communications, available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2007/06/20070202%20Credit%Lyonnais.pdf. 
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4 The most senior class of claims which would be impaired if value were to be distributed according to absolute 
priority is referred to as the “fulcrum” security. 
5 Commercial banks are prohibited from owning significant amounts of stock in nonfinancial firms under Section 16 
of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, the Bank holding Company Act, and 
the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Y. 
6 Such regulations restrict how much equity lenders can hold in nonfinancial firms and require banks to increase 
their risk-based regulatory capital when holding riskier assets such as stock. 
7 See also Dhillon, Noe, and Ramirez (2007), Carapeto (1999), and Chatterjee, Dhillon and Ramirez (2004) for 
evidence on DIP financing in Chapter 11. 
8 A debtor can choose to file for bankruptcy in any of four locations: the district where the corporation is domiciled, 
the district where the debtor has its principal place of business, the district where its principal assets are located, or 
any district where an affiliate of the debtor has already filed for bankruptcy. 
9 “Critical vendors” are typically unsecured trade creditors that demand payment on their pre-petition claims as a 
precondition to continue supplying the debtor in bankruptcy. The practice of allowing these payments is 
controversial, because it elevates the priority of these “critical” vendors above other unsecured creditors. Denying 
these payments, however, may jeopardize the debtor’s survival. The Seventh Circuit’s disapproval of a bankruptcy 
judge’s authorization of critical vendor payments in the Kmart bankruptcy may have affected the status of the 
Northern District of Illinois as a bankruptcy venue (Baird 2010). 
10 As Chang and Schoar acknowledge, the “pro-debtor/pro-creditor” categorization may not be clear-cut. For 
example, a lifting of the automatic stay might benefit a secured creditor at the expense of unsecured creditors. A sale 
of assets may benefit the debtor’s management (who might be rehired by the purchaser in a going-concern sale) or it 
may be driven by secured creditor control over the debtor. 
11 As noted above, Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) also find that a high fraction of incumbent managers are rehired by 
firms restructured through Swedish auction bankruptcy. Contrary to LoPucki and Doherty (2007), they suggest that 
these managers have firm specific skills, which make them the best candidates to continue run the reorganized firms. 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2003) find no difference in the post-bankruptcy operating performance between firms rehiring 
old management and firms hiring new outside management, indicating that there are no systematic differences in 
their management skills. 
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12 One high-profile example is the TWA bankruptcy, in which American Airlines was the buyer and DIP financer. 
13 For an alternative bankruptcy mechanism that is designed to resolve the fire sale bias problem and induce the 
efficient sale/reorganization decision, see Casey (2011). For an analysis of optimal auctions when inside bidders 
have superior information to outside bidders, see Povel and Singh (2007). 
